



Comparing Public Discourse on Immigration in Scandinavia: Some Background Notes 
and Preliminary Results 
 
Abstract: This article briefly presents the SCANPUB project, devoted to the comparative 
study of public discourse on immigration in Scandinavia from 1970 to 2016, from which this 
issue of Javnost/The Public stem. Its emphasis is on a discussion of the terms “nation” and 
“nationalism”, particularly the notion of “methodological nationalism” in relation to the 
project. SCANPUB is not least about how the public sphere in liberal democracies handles 
large, complex issues over time, and the article thus deals with relatively recent contributions 
to the theory of the public sphere, concluding with a turn toward deliberative systems theory. 
Some preliminary empirical results are reported and references are made to the other articles 
in this issue. 
 





   Migratory movements have over the last fifty years or so stood out as an increasingly 
important political and socio-cultural issue all over the so-called Western world. For anyone 
interested in how democracy functions, it is evidently of great importance to study how this 
system of government handles a major issue such as migration and the various challenges it 
represents. To the extent that the public sphere is a central element in any functioning liberal 
democracy, a study of the public sphere’s role in the formation of attitudes, opinions and 
decision-making is essential.  
 
   SCANPUB is a project designed to chart, describe, analyse, evaluate and compare public 
discourse on immigration in the three Scandinavian countries 1970-2016 and to explain 
observed differences, also with respect to the relations between public discourse and, on the 
one hand, immigration policies, and, on the other, the public’s attitudes and opinions. It starts 
from the general impression that the three Scandinavian countries – Denmark, Norway and 
Sweden – in spite of all of their similarities and close ties - have had strikingly different 
public discourses on the issue of immigration and have developed quite different political 
regimes in relevant policy areas. A systematic, longitudinal comparative study of public 
discourse on immigration in the three countries is, however, lacking, as is systematic 
normative evaluations of it. Furthermore, few systematic attempts at explaining similarities 
and differences have been made.  
 
   The differences between the Scandinavian countries with respect to immigration discourse 
and policies are interesting since the three countries in question normally are seen as so 
similar in many respects. In fact, as put by Pettersen and Østby (2013,76): “With so many 
political and social similarities between the Scandinavian countries, we are as close to an 
experimental situation as is possible in social sciences.” In other words, the comparative work 
to be conducted is one between very similar systems where the estimation of relations 
between independent and dependent variables is facilitated.  
 
   A prerequisite for such an endeavour is regarding these three nation-states as historically 
developed facts. To some, SCANPUB may be guilty of “methodological nationalism”. 
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According to Ulrich Beck (2007, 287), “methodological nationalism takes the following ideal 
premises for granted: it equates society with nation-state societies, and sees states and their 
governments as the cornerstones of a social sciences analysis.» While we do understand them 
as implicated in a variety of trans- and international dynamics, the three countries cannot in 
our project be treated only as “social constructs” in a sense that makes them appear somewhat 
haphazard or utterly artificial. We regard them as historically operative, factual entities – parts 
of the world; not, of course, isolated from it. What SCANPUB shows, however, is how 
important the nation-state still is, even at this stage of transnational cooperation and 
globalization, where international or even global conditions impact so directly and 
significantly on them. Moreover, the understandings of terms such as “nation” and 
“nationalism” are key topics of ongoing debates related to migration. While “the nation-state” 
was presumed more or less dead in much writing on political sociology a decade or two ago, 
it is by now clear that this diagnosis was premature: It won’t lie down. 
 
   This article argues in favour of this view, in two ways. Firstly, by presenting and discussing 
various prominent theories of nation, nation-states and nationalism more generally, not only 
recent ones but also key contributions dating back to the late 19th century. Secondly, by 
showing how our understanding of Scandinavian public spheres has to be informed by the 
specificities of the nation-states in which they are historically shaped. In a third and final part, 
differences between the public discourses on immigration in the three countries will be 
presented through a few preliminary results of our research. A key question is to which extent 
longer historical perspectives, spanning, say, a couple of centuries, are helpful when it comes 
to explaining the observed differences.  
 
 
Globalization and the Nation-state 
 
   People influenced by the wave of sociological and cultural studies literature on 
cosmopolitanism and globalization in the 1990s and early 2000s, might find it old-fashioned 
or even reactionary to emphasise national and regional particularities. The nation-state was 
expected to lose political and cultural importance, and this also took on a normative 
dimension: It should no longer be regarded as important, not only for empirical reasons but 
also on ethical and political grounds. 
 
   The scholarly tradition known as cultural studies was, for instance, in the 1990s much 
preoccupied with “glocalisation”, a term that highlighted the reduced importance and possible 
withering-away of the nation state and national identity with it.  Stuart Hall once described the 
phenomenon as follows:  
 
One of the things which happens when the nation-state begins to weaken, becoming 
less convincing and less powerful, is that the response seems to go in two ways 
simultaneously.  It goes above the nation-state and it goes below it.  It goes global and 
local in the same moment.  Global and local are the two faces of the same movement 
from one epoch of globalization, the one which has been dominated by the nation-
state, the national economies, the national cultural identities, to something new.  
        (Hall 1997, 26f) 
 
   Glocalization was for Hall a new phase of globalization. In the previous phase – by which 
he appears to mean, with his British background, the classic imperialist system as manifest in 
the British Empire – that the nation state was at the centre of the world system. But then the 
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Empire was dismantled and a new form of globalization was taking over. The nation-state 
would lose its previously central position since three forces operate above and across national 
borderlines: First, the economy becomes increasingly transnational and global through the 
role of multinational corporations and world-wide financial trading 24/7. Second, 
international organizations like the UN, NATO and the EU increasingly take over functions 
that used to belong to the nation-state. Thirdly, ecological issues are international and 
basically global - anything from pollution to climate change do not respect national borders at 
all.  But all of this would at the same time give a new importance to the local or regional 
level, especially when it comes to the formation of identity. One cannot expect most people to 
identify themselves simply as “world citizens” and most people’s everyday lives are spent in 
some local or regional community to a great extent.   
 
   What is particularly interesting in this context, is what Hall said about a change in the 
character of national identity in this phase of transition: 
 
All I want to say about that is, that when the era of nation-states in globalization 
begins to decline, one can see a regression to a very defensive and highly dangerous 
form of national identity which is driven by a very aggressive form of racism. 
(Hall 1997, 26) 
 
Did Hall foresee the recent wave of more or less extreme right-wing nationalism over most of 
the Western world? It seems he correctly saw a potential for a return to aggressive and 
perhaps racist nationalism in the current phase of globalization. But it appears he was more 
preoccupied with the positive potential of the new phase – possibilities for a blooming of lots 
of new sorts of identities and voices that had been suppressed in the age of the nation-state.  
 
   Hall is here representative of a much broader tendency in much scholarly work and related 
non-academic writing in the 1980s and 90s that was very critical of the nation-state, regarding 
it as passé and reactionary, implicitly racist or at least xenophobic. This is where the 
connection with the issue of immigration is: When nationalism now seems to have come back 
with a vengeance after about three decades, is it only the defensive and “highly dangerous” 
version that Hall talked about we see?  
 
   Current nationalism may well be defensive and some of it even highly dangerous. But this is 
not all there is to say about it. Nationalism is also, historically as well as today, tied to 
democracy, both as a form of government and as a way of life, a culture. This is important to 
keep in mind when trying to understand the increased support that right-wing, nationalist, 
anti-immigration parties are getting these days: Some of the reasons might not simply be 
deplorably reactionary, they might also have to do with forms of a democratic deficit in the 
current state of affairs. 
 
   In the following, I will first look into the historical links between modern democracy, 
represented by the complex phenomenon known as “the public sphere”, and the nation-state. 
The public sphere is so central to democracy because it is where the twin freedoms of 
information and expression are exercised and it is through public discourse the public, i.e. the 
people, is supposed to influence political decision-making. 
 
 
Nation, Democracy and the Public Sphere 
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   The development of a public sphere in Western Europe was intimately linked to the growth 
of the first modern mass media, print media such as books, newspapers, journals, pamphlets 
and so on. It was also linked to the growth of the modern market economy, capitalism, which 
Jürgen Habermas in Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit refers to as the historical “engine” that 
drove the process. The young bourgeoisie had both certain important common interests and 
resources that made them capable of challenging the monarchic state power of that day and 
age. The historian Benedict Anderson, on the other hand, combined these phenomena in his 
term “print capitalism” in his classic book, Imagined Communities (Anderson [1983] 1991). 
He argued print capitalism was the driving force behind the establishment of the nation as an 
“imagined” but very real community.  
 
   This parallel between these two classics indicate just how closely related the two notions – 
public sphere and nation – are, historically and theoretically. They come together in our 
simple, classical understanding of what democracy is: A system of governance where the 
inhabitants of a certain territory decide for themselves how this territory is to be run.  This is 
also a basic point in the more precise and therefore complex formulation Habermas once 
provided of the first principle of the public sphere: The bourgeois public sphere emerged as 
the basis for modern democracy, historically and in principle, in Western Europe, in the form 
of a confrontation between a government which controls a certain geographical area on the 
one hand and a collective of citizens openly discussing matters of common concern on the 
other. (Habermas [1962] 1989, 279) 
 
   In principle, citizens are to care about the common good, not their personal or private (e.g. 
economic) interests. They then have to imagine themselves as members of a community.  
Interestingly, there is a potential for this in the role of homme or Mensch in the sphere of 
intimacy where subjectivity is produced, not least through the practicing and enjoyment of the 
arts.  The latter go on also in the cultural public sphere, which is linked to the sphere of 
intimacy (Habermas  [1962]1989, 51). 
 
   This original model thus obviously suggests that the public sphere cannot function without 
an experience of a considerable degree of community between citizens. And this experience 
cannot be only intellectual. In order to work, a community must also be felt, e.g. also be based 
in emotions.  Hence the importance of the cultural part of the public sphere for this purpose, 
whether consciously declared or not. The public sphere in the modern sense was born around 
the transition from the Enlightenment to Romanticism. This is well worth keeping in mind 
whenever there is talk of Reason as central to the notion of the public sphere: Reason, or 
rationality, would in reality include rather than exclude emotionality. There’s never been 
politics without passion, or “affect” as current terminology goes. Hence the emotionally 
engaging activities and cultural expressions of the cultural public sphere are very important to 
the “public use of reason” which is the purpose of the public sphere. The reflexive, never 
quite finished subjectivity developed should be one fit for civic and political participation. It 
will be shaped by and be aware of the cultural community that to a considerable extent is 
framed by the country’s borders. The cultural public sphere is where the nation and the 
national are defined and exemplified in a variety of cultural genres.  
 
   In order to place this line of thinking in its relation to the kind of cosmopolitanism Beck and 
Hall were proponents of, we will now have a closer look at a prominent critique of Habermas.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
 
 
Habermas: Nationalist Bias? 
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   Habermas stated in 1990: “Nation-state and democracy are twins born of the French 
Revolution” (Habermas [1990]1996, 493). This may sound suspicious to some supporters of 
the idea of the death of the nation-state. According to the political philosopher Nancy Fraser 
(2007), Habermas’ account of the public sphere in his classic The Structural Transformation 
of the Public Sphere “tacitly” rested on “at least six social-theoretical presuppositions” which 
all took for granted what Fraser calls “the Westphalian framing of political space” (ibid.).  
 
   For her, a Westphalian-framed political space seems to equal “the nation-state”. She is, 
however, referring to the definitions of territorial states and their proper relations that spring 
from the Peace of Westphalia. This was actually a series of peace treaties signed in 1648, 
ending the Thirty Years’ War and the Eighty Years’ War between Spain and the Dutch 
Republic. The Peace of Westphalia is commonly seen as the basis for international relations 
as they have been understood and practiced until quite recently – such as the sovereignty of 
states, their right to political self-determination and the principle of legal equality between 
states. But in 1648 it was still 150 – 200 years before the idea of nationality and the nation-
state had its breakthrough – so the treaty was about territorial states. However, the principles 
were there when nationalism developed with Romanticism from the late 18th century on and 
fit the emerging idea and system of constructed nation-states perfectly.  
 
   It thus seems as if Fraser blames Habermas for a kind of “bad” nationalist bias that makes 
his historical and theoretical view of the public sphere less useful for democratic theory in a 
globalized world increasingly marked by trans- and international structures and processes of 
power. However, the “tacit” presuppositions she lists are, basically, that in Structural 
transformation Habermas presumed there was a state which could govern a certain area; that 
those discussing in the public sphere lived in that area, and that the economy within the 
boundaries in question would be a central subject for debates. He also supposed – and found, 
historically, just as Benedict Anderson did 20 years later – that media and communication 
infrastructures were a basis for nation-wide debates and cultural dissemination and reckoned a 
shared language had to be there, out of pure necessity. Habermas also regarded literary fiction 
and public discourse about it as a key to the emergence of the bourgeois public sphere as such 
and for the kind of subjectivity that made individuals become citizens: Individuals but also 
parts of a bounded collective. Habermas was thus largely right on all accounts. Nation-states 
are still politically operative units along the lines suggested above, in spite of all the important 
modifications that have occurred. Why else would we have Brexit and a large number of other 
country-specific problematic issues to discuss?  
 
 
 Nations, Nationalisms and Ethnicity 
 
   In his 1983 classic Nations and Nationalism, Ernest Gellner defined ‘nationalism’ as 
“primarily a political principle that holds that the political and the national unit should be 
congruent” (1). Gellner tied, in a functionalist type of argument, nationalism to modernity and 
the sociological demands of industrial society, where a standardized culture in a given 
territory became necessary. There was a need for an educational system in order to produce 
the now necessary qualified labour but also in order to reduce communication problems and 
secure a rational organization of a society with an increasingly complex and technologically 
advanced economy.  
 
 6 
  This view is helpful when it comes to explaining the general breakthrough of the nation-state 
model at a certain time in history. But it fails to explain what can be seen as national 
movements in pre-industrial societies and it does not explain why people have lined up 
willing to die for these functional cultural constructions. It may well be that nationalism 
demands that the demos, i.e. the “people” that constitute the citizenry in democratic states 
should be the same as the ethnos, or, in Gellner’s terms, that the “political unit” should be the 
same as the “national unit”.  But what is the “national unit”? What is a “nation”? 
 
   Gellner seems to have thought that the nation is the same as an ethnicity. The Greek word 
ethnos is indeed commonly translated as “nation” and so it is no wonder that these terms have 
been confused for decades. A spontaneous definition of a “nation” among most social 
scientists would be hard to distinguish from the definition of “ethnos”, “ethnicity” and “ethnic 
group” – basically understood as a large or smaller group of people who see themselves as 
having a common ancestry and a common culture – and is perceived as a distinct group also 
by others. The term is sometimes said to have been introduced to social science by Max 
Weber in 1922, when he defined it as “human groups that entertain a subjective belief in their 
common descent because of similarities of physical type or of customs or both, or because of 
memories of colonization and migration; this belief must be important for group formation; 
furthermore it does not matter whether an objective blood relationship exists”. (Weber [1922] 
1968) The latter sentence is important: Weber held that ethnicity is künstlich, i.e. artificial. 
The social sciences have ever since tended to stress the constructed nature of both ethnic 
groups and nations.   
 
   The Prague-born political scientist Karl Deutsch in his Nationalism and Its Alternatives 
(1969, xviii) said: “‘A nation’, so goes a rueful European saying, ‘is a group of persons united 
by a common error about their ancestry, and a common dislike of their neighbors.’» There 
may be something to this. But the word’s meaning is in fact not so easy to pin down. “Nation” 
might simply mean the same as “country”, i.e. a political and territorial unit with a certain set 
of borders. This says nothing of the composition of the population living within these borders.  
Other definitions tend to speak of some kind or degree of similarity or communality between 
the individual members of a population, such as one found at Dictionary.com: A nation is  “a 
large body of people, associated with a particular territory, that is sufficiently conscious of its 
unity to seek or to possess a government peculiarly its own”.  This is clearly a definition that, 
for instance, makes the evidently multi-ethnic USA and Canada nation-states. The national 
may be an overarching politico-cultural construction, above differences between linguistic 
communities and ethnicities. The US has lots of ethnicities but its one and only nationality is 
made from its history, its rituals e.g. in schools, its sports events, and its cultural industries. 
 
   A closer look will reveal that almost all older nation-states are actually multi-ethnic and 
have been so also before the migratory movements associated with globalization over the last 
few decades:  from Spain to India, from China to Finland. This is what makes the Breton 
Ernest Renan’s lecture at the Sorbonne on the 11th of March 1882 important. The lecture, 
Qu’est-ce qu’une nation?, actually argued a view of what a nation is that still appears 
relevant.  
 
   Renan said the nation could not be based in race, since the “noblest nations” such as France, 
Spain, Italy and England, were also the most racially mixed. Neither could it be based in 
religion, since religion had long since become a matter of individual choice and hence an 
English or French person could be a catholic, a protestant, a Jew – or, one might now add, a 
Muslim.  The nation cannot be based in language either, since so many nations have several 
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languages – language could at best be an “invitation” to form a union, it cannot force it. 
Geography cannot be decisive either: “Mountains don’t know how to carve out countries”.  
Instead, Renan suggested “the possession in common of a rich trove of memories” and an 
“actual consent, the desire to live together, the will to continue to value the undivided, shared 
heritage.”  Renan also underlined that the ability to forget was as important to the making of a 
nation as the ability to remember, in France, for instance, the massacres on the Cathars in the 
13th century and the slaughtering of Huguenots in the 16th century. He spoke of the nation as a 
result of a daily referendum – the choice to continue to live together must actually be made 
again and again, as when marriages go on, or as when we choose to go on living every day. 




Nationality as Althusser’ian Ideology and Bourdieu’ian Habitus 
 
   A different, important perspective can be tied, in part, to Louis Althusser’s theory of 
ideology (Althusser [1970]1971). While most references to this theory in literary or cinema 
studies were to the idea of how ideology hails the subject, fewer noted the point that ideology 
impacts on our lives not least through its existence in the forms of material structures and 
more or less ritual practices that are prescribed by these structures. This idea is related to that 
of habitus in Bourdieu’s thinking (Bourdieu 1984:170), or, simply, habit in everyday 
language. Habits are formed around the various more or less unavoidable elements in our 
everyday lives, whether it concerns the architecture of classrooms, formed by certain ideas 
about pedagogical relations, school curricula we are forced to be acquainted with or the nature 
of radio and television broadcasting which have followed people in particular rhythms 
throughout every day, week, season and year.  To the extent that a nation-state has had these 
elements, its citizens will share a repertoire of cultural references – connotations – that are not 
shared by people from other nation-states. (Cf Gripsrud 2002) Any person who has lived 
abroad for an extended period will have abundant personal experience here. I have elsewhere 
(Gripsrud 2002) defined “culture” as a “web of connotations”.   
 
   The cultural repertoires of habits and webs of connotations provided by national institutions  
provide shared experiences that may last a lifetime and have considerable emotional power. 
This is part of what provides coherence and trust in a society, as well as an engagement in the 
political processes concerning the future of the national community.  Because of the power 
inherent in it, the national can also be mobilized in support of aggressive purposes, whether it 
is about waging wars or about kicking out recently arrived immigrants. But this chauvinism is 
not something that necessarily follow whether from the nation or from the relatively innocent 
nationalism sometimes referred to as patriotism. A reasonable view of nationalism 
presupposes a sharp distinction between the two. 
 
 
Civic Culture and Constitutional Patriotism  
 
   One might think of non-aggressive nationalism or patriotism as related to the notion of civic 
culture, which was introduced in political science in the early 1960s by Gabriel Almond and 
Sidney Verda (1963). In a comparative study of different democratic states, one central result 
was the idea that a “civic culture” is a culture that encourages political involvement. Pride in 
at least some aspects of one's nation is one of the characteristics of such a culture. Some 
degree of patriotism means that there is an emotional investment in elections: They are about 
 8 
the future of something one really cares about.  There is furthermore a general valuing of 
participation in local government, in political parties – disagreement is tolerated - and in 
various civic and voluntary associations – all of which indicates the existence of a community 
which is not just a matter fact but also of affect.  People who share these characteristics of a 
civic culture also tend to share a considerable degree of trust in each other and an expectation 
of fair treatment by government authorities. They also tend to be self-confident as to their 
competence for participating in politics and they are able to talk freely and frequently about 
politics with anyone. 
   These features of civic culture, are close to the defining features of what has been called 
civic nationalism or, sometimes, liberal nationalism. It defines the nation as an association of 
people with equal political rights and allegiance to similar political procedures. According to 
the principles of civic nationalism the nation is not based on common ethnic ancestry, but is a 
political entity, whose core is not ethnicity but rather the elements identified by Ernest Renan 
– and shared rituals, habits and webs of connotations with sometimes great emotional power. 
In France the term ”nation” was used to signify all citizens of the territorial state «France» 
and a contract between these citizens and the state: The nation was to be sovereign. This 
political term was, however, accompanied by la patrie, the fatherland.  This duality 
problematizes Habermas’ claim that the French revolution changed the meaning of «nation» 
from a pre-political to a political one by replacing the original meaning of a commonality of 
origins (natio = birth) with the sense of a democratic political community.  
   It is the latter understanding Habermas ([1990] 1996] wants to retain when ridding the 
notion of citizenship of its connections to a sense of a broader cultural community. He 
imagines a Verfassungspatriotismus, a «constitutional patriotism», where a love for a 
democratic constitution is what remains after «dissolving the semantic links between 
citizenship and national identity». The historical background for his thinking at the time was 
the fall of the «iron curtain», the increasing integration of the European Union and ”the 
tremendous tide of immigration from the poor regions of the East and South, with which 
Europe will be increasingly confronted in the coming years» (491f). This process 
”exacerbates the conflict between universalistic principles of constitutional democracy, on the 
one hand, and the particularistic claims to preserve the integrity of established forms of life, 
on the other” (492). He wants to hold on to what he calls (a shared) «political culture», i.e. the 
procedures and practices of liberal democracies and a demand that all citizens are assimilated 
in it. But otherwise anyone, including all newcomers, can hold on to and cultivate their own 
cultures – seemingly without limits (513f). This form of multiculturalism is thus based in a 
dividing line between political culture and all other forms of culture. But reality is, as already 
the notion of civic culture indicates, far messier.  
   While Habermas ties his idea of a purely constitutional patriotism to the French notion of 
nation, without mentioning the accompaniment of la patrie, it is worth noting that Ernest 
Renan did not reject that geography, a shared language, shared customs, shared history and 
religion were of importance in the formation of a nation. He only held that none of these 
factors are decisive. And if we take a closer look at the French notion of a nation, we find the 
following: 
But if nationhood is constituted by political unity, it is centrally expressed in the 
striving for cultural unity. Political inclusion has ideally entailed cultural assimilation, 
for ethnic peripheries and immigrants alike; the universalist theory and practice of 
citizenship has depended on confidence in the assimilatory workings of school, army 
and centralized administration. 
      (Brubaker 1990, 386) 
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   In order for immigrants to be accepted as French by other French, a considerable degree of 
cultural integration is required. As put by Williams (2001,146): ”In these terms, birth and 
residence in principle defined citizenship, although in fact cultural assimilation granted it”. 
This implies that the difference traditionally pointed out between Germany’s citizenship 
policies and those of France is less clear cut than often imagined. In the course of the 1990s, 
as it became clear that «guest workers» (Gastarbeitern) were not leaving and as other 
immigrant groups were growing, it became clear to German politicians that some changes in 
the hitherto quite strict Blut und Boden-related principles had to be made. Thus, a «rhetorical 
convergence» (Brubaker 1990, 387; Williams 2001,146) took place between the German and 
the French policies. Still, differences between the two countries remained, and both Brubaker 
and Williams explain this with the fact that both practices have long and solid roots in the 
specific histories of the two: Nationality in this historical sense is in other words still 
politically operative.  
   Summarizing the above, one can imagine an understandable and acceptable nationalism as a 
form of patriotism which is a highly useful element in a civic culture beneficial to a 
functioning democracy. It does depend to some degree on a shared national culture, 
constructed and produced by a variety of social and cultural institutions, forming central 
elements in people’s national identities, but not necessarily tied to a specific ethnic group. The 
latter my well hold true even when a particular ethnic group originally formed some key 
elements in it. Several such elements may be adopted by other ethnicities arriving without 
wiping out their ethnic specificities. This is at least the case in countries where basic liberal 
freedoms such as the freedoms of expression and information, the freedom of religion and the 
freedom of association are maintained. In a liberal democracy, one might imagine this leading 
to a greater plurality of cultural forms and identities both among the original inhabitants and 
the newcomers, on the basis of liberal, democratic principles and under a cultural umbrella 
made up of a broadly shared web of connotations and key values. 
   This implies more generous, inclusive conceptions of national identities. Identity means 
”sameness” or homogeneity in relation to something or someone else. But we are not even 
identical with ourselves: As first Robert Louis Stevenson demonstrated in Dr Jekyll and Mr 
Hyde and later, for instance, Sigmund Freud and Pierre Bourdieu has shown, we are 
composed of layers and elements acquired throughout our lifetime that may point in different 
directions. Consequently, any idea or ideology that tries to turn one layer or element in our 
complex identities into the defining feature of our subjectivity, is deeply suspect, whether it is 
about nationality, gender, soccer teams, musical forms or whatever. In other words, I may 
well be a Norwegian or a Slovenian, but this does not prevent me from also being and feeling 
like a European, a cosmopolitan, a global citizen (and e.g. a soccer fan, a music-lover etc.).  
 
   Chauvinism and “ethno-nationalism” are inadequate and dangerous in today’s world. A 
pluralistically founded nationalism in the form of patriotism, is not. The latter makes the 
public sphere and democracy thrive. 
 
 
Scandinavia’s Internal Relations and Nationalisms 
 
   Fredrik Barth ([1969]1998) influentially argued, on the basis of extensive field-work, that 
ethnicities are not closed off to one another, are not finite in their memberships, but open, 
forever changing through their relationships with other ethnicities and through the continuing 
series of changes of all sorts that we call history. It is clear, Barth says, “that boundaries 
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persist despite a flow of personnel across them […], so “ethnic distinctions do not depend on 
an absence of social interaction and acceptance but are quite to the contrary often the very 
foundations on which embracing social systems are built” (9-10). Scandinavian history and 
e.g. phenomena such as national stereotypes may well serve as illustrations of these ideas. 
The three originally very ethnically homogenous countries are in certain ways culturally 
distinct, and (some of) their specificities are likely reasons why their responses to immigration 
over the last few decades have been different.  
 
   The three countries have been closely related and intertwined in a variety of ways since 
Viking times, politically so through various unions (and wars!) since the 14th century. 
Sweden has been independent since the 16th century, and the same applies to Denmark. 
Norway, independent in medieval times, was then a part of Denmark for roughly 400 years 
until 1814. The present map was established when Denmark after supporting Napoleon had to 
give up its rule over Norway, which then entered into a union with Sweden. In the transitional 
phase, however, a national assembly gathered in April and May of 1814 where a Constitution 
inspired by American and French forerunners was signed after 5 weeks on the 17th of May. 
The union with Sweden thus came to consist, largely, of a shared king and a common foreign 
policy mostly controlled by Sweden. Nevertheless, this means Norway is the youngest of the 
three nation-states, fully “reborn” as such as late as 1905. 
 
   In line with developments elsewhere in Europe, the 19th century was marked by cultural and 
political efforts to develop national cultures drawing not least on German national romanticist 
ideas. This was particularly the case in Denmark and Norway. In Denmark, this tendency was 
strengthened by defeat in the war with Germany over the southern part of Jutland in 1864, 
where 1/3 of its territory was lost and so a view of the country as small and vulnerable took 
hold. Nationalism there was to a considerable degree also marked by the work of the 
theologian N.F.S. Grundtvig, whose mix of religion, folkelighed (“folksiness”) and 
nationalism also influenced Norway and, less so, Sweden. Toward the turn of the century, the 
situation in Sweden was, on the other hand, marked by social and not least political cleavage 
between a right-wing, upper class interest in constructing a backward-looking national 
identity and a liberal and left-wing vision of Sweden simply as the most modern, advanced 
country in the world (Sejersted 2013, 25). This became the official and dominant idea in 
Sweden. According e.g. to a leading Swedish social democrat in 2002, Mona Sahlin, 
immigrants are lucky to have a culture, she could not think of any Swedish culture outside of 
certain “silly” phenomena such as Midsummer’s Eve and some songs.1 While Sweden 
remained neutral during WW2, Denmark and Norway were both attacked and occupied by 
Nazi Germany. There are thus evidently historical reasons why open nationalism has been 
more prominent in Denmark and Norway than in Sweden 
 
   The three countries went through democratization processes at somewhat different paces 
and in somewhat different forms. Norway’s 1814 Constitution was by far the most democratic 
for decades. The country had no nobility and the social structure was generally clearly more 
egalitarian than those of Sweden and Denmark. Reforms in local government in the 1830s 
further increased popular influence and voting rules were much more generous than in the 
neighbouring countries. The modern principle of parliamentarism (the government’s 
legitimacy to be based in a majority in parliament) was introduced in 1884.  Universal 
suffrage was granted to men in 1898 and women in 1913. Denmark discarded absolutist 
monarchy with its 1849 Constitution and introduced universal suffrage for both men and 
women in 1915. Sweden finally replaced its medieval national assembly based on 
representatives of nobility, clergy, bourgeoisie and farmers with a bicameral parliamentary 
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institution in 1866. Only the Second Chamber was directly elected, the First Chamber was 
elected by city and county councillors. The modern parliamentary principle was not 
introduced until 1917, over 30 years after Norway. Universal suffrage for both women and 
men was introduced in 1919.  
 
   The social and economic conditions were also quite different in the three countries. Sweden 
had roughly double the number of inhabitants.   In 1900 it was about 5 million, while 
Denmark had about 2,5 and Norway about 2,2. All three had very high numbers of emigrants 
to, mostly, North America, with Norway sending the by far highest proportion of its 
inhabitants overseas. The rise of industrial capitalism took place in all three countries in the 
second half of the 19th and the first decades of the 20th but was marked by important 
topographic and other natural differences in addition to the social ones. Sweden had minerals 
and vast forests, with a highly productive agricultural sector in the southern part marked by a 
high number of very large farms. Importantly, its financial resources were solid and much 
more concentrated than in the neighbouring countries, making for a rapid growth in advanced 
industries with many factories each employing thousands of people in the late 19th century. 
Denmark had few natural resources but a highly productive agricultural sector and very good 
topographical conditions for the construction of infrastructure such as roads and railways. 
Mountainous Norway also had forests and some minerals as well as significant fisheries, but a 
very difficult topography for transport by land. International shipping early on became a 
major economic activity.  
 
   The fact that Swedish industry operated relatively undisturbed during the war gave Sweden 
a head start in the post-war years. This was a key reason why Sweden started recruiting labour 
abroad much earlier than the other two countries – if we disregard the import of Polish and 
German workers to Danish agriculture in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. While most 
immigrant workers to begin with came from Finland, Swedish industry also actively recruited 
labour from Southern Europe already in the 1950s. Consequently, modern Swedish 
immigration history is considerably longer than that of its neighbours, and immigrants’ share 
of the population in Sweden has been the largest in Scandinavia for much over half a century.  
 
   The three languages were and are mutually understandable, with common roots in Old 
Norse. Norway’s 1814 Constitution stated that all laws should be written in Norwegian, but 
this was stated in pure Danish. Written Norwegian was not distinct from written Danish until 
a linguistic reform in 1907. While gradually “norwegianized” (in line with the spoken 
Norwegian of the educated classes) became the dominant form, Parliament decided in 1885 
that the New Norse language, constructed in the mid-19th century on the basis of the country’s 
rural dialects, was legally on a par with Dano-Norwegian. This has had many consequences, 
most important of which is an internationally quite unique acceptance for the use of dialects 
in all sorts of public discourse. The literary public spheres of the three countries were 
intimately connected in several ways, especially the Danish and the Norwegian, since most 
leading Norwegian authors continued to publish with Danish publishers throughout the 19th 
century. The three countries all had Lutheran churches firmly tied to the states/governments, 
and thus had fairly similar public religious lives. Their school systems were early on 
developed so that most inhabitants were literate early on in the 19th century. In 1905, an 
overwhelming majority voted in a plebiscite to re-install monarchy in Norway, and since then 
the three countries have all been constitutional monarchies with a very limited political role to 
play – one exception being the New Year’s speeches to the population through major mass 
media, cf. Kjeldsen’s article in this issue. Norway and Sweden have had an ethnic minority 
mainly located in their northernmost regions, the Sami people, and small national minorities 
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such as Roma as well. But largely, all three countries have been ethnically very homogenous 
until post-WW2 immigration started.  
 
   Striking similarities in the growth and composition of civil society are to a considerable 
extent tied to the shared linguistic and religious conditions. Religious and social movements 
such as temperance and other idealistic associations, professional organizations and trade 
unions developed in all three countries, especially in the last half of the 19th century. This is a 
key reason for similarities in later political developments: The three Scandinavian peoples 
were to a very high degree organized – members of one or several nation-wide organizations. 
Most of these organizations formed public sub-spheres with their own print media, their own 
meeting places or buildings, their own specific rituals and festivities – but were at the same 
time also tied to the general public sphere through representatives in the parliamentary 
assemblies and national media.  
 
   Particularly important was the development of strong socialist/social-democratic labour 
movements. In parliamentary politics they reached government power first in Sweden, when 
the Social Democrats participated in a coalition government as early as 1917. In Denmark the 
social democrats were in government in coalitions or alone most of the time from 1922 on. In 
Norway, after a couple of weeks in government in 1928, the social democrats were in 
government for decades from 1935 on.2 Especially noteworthy here is the long stretch of 
more or less continuous single-party social-democratic governments from the 1930s on to the 
60s or 70s in all three countries. This is when their welfare states were created, with a social-
democratic leadership but with considerable cross-party support. The same goes for their 
public service broadcasting monopolies, which contributed significantly to the formation of 
relatively homogenous national cultural identities. In all three countries governments also 
installed quite ambitious cultural policies, supporting a wide variety of national institutions 
and practitioners of the various arts. The population as a whole has, in principle, been invited 
to take part in and benefit from academically produced knowledge as well as artistic 
expressions. 
 
   All of these factors have contributed to the fact that Scandinavia has enjoyed high quality 
government (cf. e.g. Rothstein, Teorell [2008]) and public institutions over centuries: Levels 
of corruption have, according to international rankings, been exceptionally low, and, 
correspondingly, levels of social trust exceptionally high. Such features marks Scandinavia as 
a region and form part of an explanation for anything from relatively peaceful social relations, 
low crime rates and general organizational, socio-economic efficiency.  
 
   Significant changes have, however, occurred since the early 1990s: A political turn to the 
right has left its marks on the welfare systems of both Sweden and Denmark, albeit somewhat 
differently: Sweden suffered a serious economic crisis from around 1990 and cut the welfare 
budgets significantly in an attempt to handle the situation, along with extensive privatization 
of areas such as education and health services. Denmark has over the last few decades 
developed a system where the original universalist principles have been modified in the 
direction of emphasising “incentives”, or, the “worthiness” of recipients, thus creating a more 
“dualist” system disfavouring not least immigrants. In Norway, thanks especially to the 
country’s oil-based wealth, universalist principles have been retained to a much higher degree 
than in the neighbouring countries, but some of the same sorts of pressures have been 
noticeable there as well (cf. e.g. Bay et al. [2013]). These developments have demonstrated 
the welfare state’s degree of vulnerability and thus contributed to the perceived importance of 
how immigration, i.e. largely refugees, asylum-seekers and family reunification – impacts on 
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the system as either a financial burden or as a threat to the social trust that forms the basis of 
the system, especially in that it supports the willingness to pay high taxes.  
 
 
History and Immigration Discourse 
 
   These are the three countries in which SCANPUB studies how the immigration issue has 
been handled in the public sphere(s) since 1970. On the basis of the above sketch of the 
history of the Scandinavian countries, to which extent can one expect developments to be 
different from elsewhere in the world, and to which extent can they be expected to be 
internally different in the three countries in question? With e.g. the recent changes to the 
welfare system and other areas of public policy in mind, is a longer historical perspective at 
all relevant? 
 
   The results of SCANPUB’s quantitative content analysis of immigration coverage in the 
Scandinavian press 1970-2016 are reported in some detail in Hovden and Mjelde’s article in 
this issue. The shortest possible version is that the analysis confirmed the widespread general 
impression that formed the starting point of the whole project: On a scale from the most 
immigration friendly to the most immigration negative, Sweden is near the first pole and 
Denmark near the other – while Norway occupies a spot somewhere between the two. We 
also performed an analysis of the same newspapers’ coverage of the “refugee crisis” of 2015 
(Hovden et al. 2017), complementing and using the codebook of a project at the London 
School of Economics (reported in Chouliaraki and Zaborowski [2017] and Georgiou and 
Zaborowski [2017]). The LSE project included the coverage in key newspapers in eight 
European countries, SCANPUB added the three in Scandinavia.  
 
   The latter project showed that the press in Scandinavia as a whole was different from that in 
other European in certain ways. The development followed the general European pattern in 
that coverage was more marked by humanitarian perspectives from April (mass drownings) to 
September (Aylan Kurdi found on the beach) than later in the autumn of 2015, when suffering 
was more abstractly presented and, especially after the terror attacks in Paris in November,  
attention turned more toward security issues and how governments strived to cope with the 
wave of new arrivals. As a whole, though, the Scandinavian press appeared different from the 
rest in two ways: (a) Like the press elsewhere in Europe, coverage  prioritised élite voices 
over those of refugees and «ordinary citizens» - but less so. (b) As for framing, the 
Scandinavian press appeared, on the whole, less preoccupied with negative consequences of 
various sorts than the press elsewhere. But this is also where differences within Scandinavia 
were quite clear: The Danish press was more negative than the other two, and the Swedish 
press put more emphasis on positive moral consequences for the population. Norway was 
located somewhere between the two (Hovden et al. 2018).  
  
   This pattern then emerged, as indicated above, also from the quantitative analysis of  
newspaper coverage of immigration of all kinds between 1970 and 2016 (cf Hovden and 
Mjelde, this issue). A major challenge for the project is now to suggest explanations for these 
differences. To which extent is it useful to look back on, say, the national histories over the 
last couple of centuries, and to which extent will a closer look at the last few decades be 
sufficient? 
 
   If national cultures matter for widespread attitudes and arguments, then the distinct histories 
and characters of nationalism and national identities are relevant for an analysis and 
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understanding of public discourse on immigration. The Swedish idea that the country’s 
distinguishing feature is its leading degree of modernity and international orientation may 
clearly point in the direction of a welcoming attitude. To the extent that Danish nationalism is 
tied to an understanding of the country as small and vulnerable and marked by Grundtvig’s 
blend of nationalism and Christianity, it is not unlikely that these features will impact on 
public discourse on immigration, especially from areas where other religions prevail. 
Norway’s nationalism is of course also of vital importance, marked by its short history as an 
independent state and German occupation during WW2 on the one hand and pride in strong 
democratic, egalitarian traditions on the other. Many public discussions of immigration tend 
to be more about “who we are (as a nation)” than about migrants of various sorts (cf. 
Andersen, this issue ). A historical perspective could also be useful when it comes to difficult 
questions about the discourse’s inclusiveness in terms of views represented. Swedish national 
newspapers seem to e.g. carry much fewer letters to the editor than their counterparts in the 
other countries and migration-negative voices appear more weakly represented. The same 
may apply to the rhetorical styles employed in public discourse, e.g. that Danish debate 
appears much more marked by crass language: This may have reasons from way before the 
1970s.  
 
   As for the specific development of immigration policies, on the other hand, any attempt at 
explanation will have to consider the political party systems of each country and the various 
constellations that have formed the parliamentary basis for governments in the three 
countries. As pointed out by political scientists (Green-Pedersen and Krogstrup 2008), 
differences between Sweden and Denmark are not least tied to the fact that the mainstream 
conservative parties in Denmark had to explore cooperation with the far right, populist party 
in order to establish a parliamentary basis for a government, since the social democrats had 
formed an alliance with the liberal centre party. In Sweden, the social democrats found 
sufficient support for a government to the left of it, so conservatives could create a 
government without involving the right-wing populists. This also had consequences for public 
debate in the two countries, since the participation of right-wing populists in government or in 
the parliamentary support for a government will tend to give their voice more prominence. 
This has also been seen in Norway, the only country in which the right-wing populist party 
has actually participated in a coalition government with the conservatives (since 2013). On 
the other hand, one has observed that a government position also curbs some of the more 
radical tendencies within the populist party since the rhetorical options of a government party 
is more limited than those of a party in opposition. 
 
   In other words, any explanation of differing patterns in public discourse between our three 
Scandinavian countries must involve both longer and shorter term historical perspectives, and 




Public Spheres Are Deliberative Systems 
 
   Habermas described the real existing public spheres of nation states in his Between Facts 
and Norms ([1992] 1996): It has a politically central, general arena, but its structure is that of 
a complex network that ”branches out into a multitude of overlapping international, national, 
regional, local, and sub cultural arenas” (373). One can also distinguish between different 
levels based on the “density” of communication, and the complexity and scope of 
organisation - ”from the episodic publics found in taverns, coffee houses, or on the streets; 
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through the occasional `arranged' publics of particular presentations and events, such as 
theatre performances, rock concerts, party assemblies, or church congresses; up to the abstract 
public sphere of isolated readers, listeners, and viewers scattered across large geographic 
areas, or even around the globe, and brought together only through the mass media.” (374). 
SCANPUB’s interest in the role of the cultural public sphere is represented in this issue by 
John Magnus R. Dahl’s contribution.  
 
   This bewildering complexity has increased tremendously after the addition of the world 
wide web and its multitudes of virtual spaces for public communication. SCANPUB aims to 
chart and analyse also some of these more recent parts of the public sphere. Examples are 
represented by Moe’s and Andersen’s articles in this issue. In order to understand them and 
their functions, we have turned our attention to deliberative systems theory as a source of 
insights that complement and follow up on the characterization of the complexity of the 
modern public sphere by Habermas above (Mansbridge et al. 2012). The over-arching 
question is how to account for the vast variety also of non- and semi-deliberative elements in 
today’s public spheres. Habermas claimed that all of the public sub-spheres within the public 
sphere remain ”porous” in their relation to one another. Deliberative systems theory holds that 
“it is necessary to go beyond the study of individual institutions and processes to examine 
their interaction in the system as a whole”, in which “a single part, which in itself might have 
a weak or even negative deliberative quality with respect to one or several deliberative ideals, 
may nevertheless make an important contribution to an overall deliberative system” 
(Mansbridge et al. 2 and 3).  
 
   But before we can understand an evaluate the «overall» deliberate systems, we need to have 
a closer look at their constituent parts. This issue also gives examples of SCANPUB’s work 
beyond what is traditionally covered by the term «public discourse». The project is, of course, 
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1 Mona Sahlin in an interview with Euroturk, a magazine  published by an organization for 
youth of Turkish descent, in 2002 https://ligator.files.wordpress.com/2010/08/intervju_3.pdf  
2 In Sweden, there was a series of social-democratic coalition, minority and majority 
governments (coalition 1917-20, 1921-23, 1924-26, 1932-36, 1936-76, 1986-91, 1994-2006, 
2014-18). In Denmark the social democrats were in government in coalitions or alone 1924-
26, 1929-39, during the 2nd world war in an all-parties coalition, and then 1947-50, 1953-68, 
1971-73, 1975-82, 1993-2001, and 2011-2015. The social-democratic Labour party in 
Norway was in government for about two weeks in 1928, and then basically ruled, with the 
exception of WW2, from 1935 to 1965, 1971-72, 1973-81,1986-91, 1990-97, 2000-01, 2005-
13. 
 
